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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WEST VALLEY CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
RANDY BURTON, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of a misdemeanor 
case. Therefore, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court should be affirmed on appeal because 
the appellant has failed to marshal the evidence and provide this 
court with an adequate record for review on appeal. 
II. Whether the officer exceeded the scope of the investigation 
by putting his head into the appellee's vehicle for the purpose 
of smelling the appellee's breath. 
III. Whether there was sufficient evidence prior to the illegal 
search to justify the officer changing the scope of the 
investigation from that of a headlight violation to that of an 
investigation of driving under the influence of alcohol. 
Appellate Court No.: 960465 CA 
Priority No. : 15 
IV. Whether the investigation of driving under the influence of 
alcohol which occurred after the illegal search was sufficiently 
attenuated from the prior illegality to justify its 
admissibility. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As to the argument that the appellant has failed to marshal 
the evidence this Court has stated that when the "record before 
us is incomplete, we are unable to review the evidence as a whole 
and must therefore presume that the verdict was supported by 
admissible and competent evidence." Sampson v. Richinsr 770 P.2d 
998, 1002 (Utah App. 1989). As to the substantive arguments on 
the motion to suppress this Court will not disturb a trial 
court's factual determinations unless such findings are deemed 
clearly erroneous. State v. Taylorf 818 P.2d 561, 565 (Utah App. 
1991); State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 208 (Utah App. 1991). 
However, a trial court's conclusions of law which arise from its 
factual findings are reviewed for correctness and afforded no 
deference. State v. Rawlingsf 829 P.2d 150, 152 (Utah App. 
1992) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44 (1953 as amended) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 15, 1996, at about 12:01 a.m., Officer Schmidt 
of the West Valley City Police Department saw the appellee's car 
traveling westbound on 3500 South without its headlights on. The 
officer was headed Eastbound on the same street. (Transcript at 
7-8). Schmidt did a U-turn to stop the appellee and turned his 
top lights on. (Transcript at 8). Other than the headlight 
violation, there was no reason to stop the appellee.1 Based on 
the fact that the appellee was driving without his headlights on, 
and nothing more, the officer formed a hunch that the appellee 
was driving under the influence. (Transcript at 2 6) 
The officer approached the driver's window and requested the 
appellee's driver's license, registration and insurance. 
(Transcript at 11). The appellee responded "Yeah" to the 
officer's request. (Transcript at 17-18). The officer put his 
nose and face inside the window as soon as he finished asking for 
the appellee's license and registration. (Transcript at 18). 
The officer then pulled his head back and nodded in affirmation 
that he smelled alcohol to the ride-a-long passenger in his 
patrol car because he had discussed this previously with his 
passenger. (Transcript at 18-19). The officer put his nose 
inside the passenger compartment to see if he could smell the 
1
 Officer Schmidt testified that the car drifted just a bit 
across the right line, however, he later testified that he did 
not recall if the car pulled right over as it went across the 
line and he also did not recall if the car went back onto the 
roadway after it had gone across the white line. (Transcript at 
9). 
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odor of alcohol. (Transcript at 12). When the officer stuck his 
head inside the vehicle he could smell the odor of alcohol. 
(Transcript at 13). Prior to that time the officer did not 
notice any slurred speech from the appellee. (Transcript at 18). 
Other than the appellee traveling without his headlights on and 
the alleged odor of alcohol, the were no other factors indicating 
that the appellee had been drinking or that he was under the 
influence of alcohol.2 The officer proceeded to put his head 
2
 The trial court found that Officer Schmidt smelled the 
odor of alcohol when he had a conversation with Mr. Burton. 
(Transcript at 27). Officer Schmidt testified that he could 
smell the odor of alcohol when he went up to the car. 
(Transcript at 10) However, this testimony is highly suspect. 
First of all the officer testified that he did not recall if the 
window was up or down when he approached. (Transcript at 10) . 
Secondly, the officer also testified that the appellee spoke with 
him several times and after speaking with him for a while, he 
could smell the odor of alcohol. 
Q Okay, did you at any point stick your head a little 
closer to the window? 
A Yes. I did. 
Q When did you do that? 
A After speaking with Mr. Burton for a brief moment, he 
was reaching for his driver's license, registration and 
insurance, I believe which was in his glove box. 
Q Okay. You did have a chance to speak with him then? 
A Oh, yeah. 
Q And did he turn and speak with you while your head was 
still outside the vehicle? 
A Yeah. He—he spoke to me several times. 
Q Okay. Did you—when he turned and spoke to you, were 
you able to ascertain if it was coming from him or not? 
A Yeah. That's—that's what made me believe that he had 
been drinking while driving— 
Q Okay. 
A —'cause I could smell the alcohol coming from his 
breath. 
Q Okay. Now, you did at one time stick your head in the 
window a little bit? 
A Could have been partially in there, yes. 
Q Okay. When did you do that? 
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inside the passenger compartment of the vehicle three or four 
more times. 
The appellant, at the close of the hearing, indicated that 
the record of the hearing was not going to be very clear with 
regards to the video tape and its contents. (Transcript at 40). 
The appellant went on to tell the trial court that if the 
appellant decided to appeal, that the attorney for the appellant 
would contact the attorney for the appellee and agree upon the 
facts as contained on the video and have those facts made part of 
the trial court's order. Id. The appellant never contacted the 
attorney for the appellee with regards to its intention of 
appealing this case or with regards to clarifying the record with 
a written order. 
A After speaking with him for awhile, I could smell the 
odor of alcohol, I just wanted to make sure the odor of alcohol 
was coming from the car and not on the street or anything right 
by there, because it is a heavily traveled road, a lot of 
pedestrian traffic and sometimes— 
(Transcript at 11-12). Based on the foregoing testimony, the 
officer was not sure if what he smelled was coming from within or 
without the vehicle. The officer went on to testify that before 
he put his head in the window he had told the appellee that he 
could smell alcohol and that in response to that the appellee 
told the officer he had been drinking. (Transcript at 15). 
The only conversation between the appellee and the officer prior 
to the officer sticking his nose and then his head in the window 
was the officers's request for the appellee's driver's license, 
registration and insurance and the appellee's response of "Yeah." 
(Transcript at 17-18). The officer is basing his prior testimony 
of his smelling the odor of alcohol on a faulty recollection of 
the appellee speaking with him several times, which conversations 
never occurred. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ON APPEAL BECAUSE THE 
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE AND PROVIDE 
THIS COURT WITH AN ADEQUATE RECORD FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL. 
The appellant has the duty to provide this court with all 
the evidence and papers necessary for review of the case. Rule 
11 of the Utah Rules of App. Pro. The appellant has failed to 
marshal the evidence. The lower court did not make findings of 
fact nor conclusions of law, and the record is incomplete. Where 
the record before this Court is incomplete, this Court has held 
that it will presume the validity of the verdict. Sampson v. 
RJChing, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah App. 1989). 
II. THE OFFICER EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION BY 
PERFORMING AN ILLEGAL SEARCH BY PUTTING HIS HEAD INTO THE 
APPELLEE'S VEHICLE FOR THE PURPOSE OF SMELLING THE 
APPELLEE'S BREATH. 
The appellee was legitimately stopped for driving without 
his headlights on. After the stop, the officer exceeded the 
scope of the stop for the headlight violation by putting his head 
inside the passenger compartment of the appellee's vehicle. The 
officer put his head inside the vehicle to search for the odor of 
alcohol. This search of the passenger compartment of the 
appellee's vehicle was not supported by probable cause and went 
beyond the scope of the initial detention. 
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III. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRIOR TO THE ILLEGAL 
SEARCH TO JUSTIFY THE OFFICER CHANGING THE SCOPE OF THE 
INVESTIGATION FROM THAT OF A HEADLIGHT VIOLATION TO THAT 
OF AN INVESTIGATION OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE. 
The only evidence that the officer had available to him 
prior to the search was the headlight violation. After the stop, 
the officer testified that the appellee turned and spoke to him 
several times and during that conversation with the appellee, the 
officer smelled the odor of alcohol. However, after reviewing 
the video, the officer admitted that the only conversation 
between him and the appellee before the search was the request by 
the officer for the appellee's driver license, registration and 
insurance information, and the appellee's single word response of 
"Yeah." The evidence available to the officer at the time that 
he conducted the search was insufficient to merit the intrusion. 
IV. THE INVESTIGATION OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
ALCOHOL WHICH OCCURRED AFTER THE ILLEGAL SEARCH WAS 
NOT SUFFICIENTLY ATTENUATED FROM THE PRIOR ILLEGALITY TO 
JUSTIFY ITS ADMISSIBILITY. 
All the evidence acquired after the illegal search was the 
fruit of the illegal search and the appellant has failed to 
produce any evidence showing any attenuation between the illegal 
search and the subsequently discovered evidence. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ON APPEAL BECAUSE 
THE APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE AND 
PROVIDE THIS COURT WITH AN ADEQUATE RECORD FOR REVIEW 
ON APPEAL. 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires 
that the appellant provide this Court with all evidence and 
papers necessary for appropriate review. This is the 
responsibility of the appealing party. See Rule 11 Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. In this case the appellant agreed to sit 
down with counsel for the appellee and prepare some findings of 
facts with regards to the contents of a video shown at the 
hearing on the motion to suppress. (Transcript at 40). This was 
never done and the record currently before this Court is 
therefore confusing and incomplete. 
Furthermore, the lower court did not make findings of facts 
and conclusions of law. The City, who wished to appeal, did not 
obtain from, nor prepare for the trial court, findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. These are necessary for appropriate 
review by this Court. The trial judge, Carlos Esqueda, was a 
Judge Pro Tern, and is no longer on the bench, thus further 
complicating this matter currently before this Court. The City's 
failure to marshal the evidence on this appeal should result in 
this Court ruling in the appellee's favor. 
In State v. Rawlings, 829 P.2d 150 (Utah App. 1992), the 
Utah Court of Appeals ruled that because of the inadequate record 
provided by the appellant to the Appeals Court, the Court could 
8 
not address the issues raised and would therefore presume 
correctness of the disposition made by the trial court. In 
another case, Sampson v. Richins. 770 P.2d 998 (Utah App. 1989), 
this Court stated that "Rule 11 directs counsel to provide this 
court with all evidence relevant to the issues raised on appeal". 
Id. at 1002. The Court further went on to say "[w]here the 
record before us is incomplete, we are unable to review the 
evidence as a whole and must therefore presume that the verdict 
was supported by admissible and competent evidence." Id. 
Findings of fact are necessary to clearly indicate the mind of 
the court and resolve issues of material fact necessary to 
justify the conclusions of law and judgment entered thereon. See 
Parks v. Zions First Nat's Bankr 673 P.2d 590, 601 (Utah 1983). 
It is the appealing party's responsibility to marshal the papers 
necessary to proceed with an appeal.3 See Rule 11 Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. In this case this was not done by the 
appellant and the Court should uphold the lower courts decision. 
In State v. Genovesif 871 P.2d 547 (Utah App. 1994), this 
Court held that a trial court must make detailed findings of fact 
and conclusions of law for adequate review on appeal. The result 
in Genovesif was a remand4 for entry of findings of fact and 
3
 In Horton v. Gem State Mut. of Utahf the Court said that 
the appellant has the burden of providing the court with an 
adequate record to preserve its arguments for review. 794 P.2d 
847, 849 (Utah App. 1990). 
4
 The appellee in this case is not requesting remand, 
instead, the Appellee is requesting that the court rule in its 
favor because the appellant failed to marshal the evidence, or 
9 
conclusions of law. Id. at 552. In this case the trial court 
judge made limited findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
supporting his decision.5 The problem is that the appellant was 
going to prepare additional findings of facts for the trial 
judge's signature. These findings were never prepared. Because 
of that failure by the appellant to adequately marshal the 
evidence the appellee requests that the Court affirm the lower 
court's decision. 
II. THE OFFICER EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION BY 
PERFORMING AN ILLEGAL SEARCH BY PUTTING HIS HEAD INTO 
THE APPELLEE'S VEHICLE FOR THE PURPOSE OF SMELLING THE 
APPELLEE'S BREATH. 
The Appellant raises the scope issue by arguing the two 
prong approach in State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994). 
The Appellant argues that the search of the interior of the 
appellee's vehicle for the odor of alcohol was justified under 
the second prong which states that a detention must be reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances that justified the 
interference in the first place. The appellee does not contend 
that the stop of his vehicle was unlawful. The appellee was 
stopped for not having his headlights on at night after having 
because after a review of the record and the transcript of the 
hearing on the motion to suppress, and the judges limited 
findings and conclusions, the court is convinced that the ruling 
is correct. 
5
 A remand in this case would create difficulties and 
unfairness to the appellee because, as previously discussed, the 
trial court judge is no longer on the bench. 
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been observed by Officer Schmidt of the West Valley City Police 
Department. 
However, the search of the interior of the appellee's 
vehicle for the odor of alcohol went beyond the scope of a 
headlight violation.6 Lopez holds that "[i]nvestigative 
questioning that further detains the driver must be supported by 
reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity." Id. at 
1132. If the questioning of a driver with regards to a crime 
outside the purpose of the initial detention must be supported by 
reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity, then a 
search of the interior of the vehicle must be supported by even 
more because it is a much greater intrusion. 
The Appellant tries to justify this intrusion upon the 
appellee's right to privacy of what is contained within his 
automobile by using language that was written with the intent of 
minimizing the intrusive nature of investigatory stops. The 
Appellant correctly argues that an officer must "diligently 
[pursue] a means of investigation that [is] likely to confirm or 
dispel their suspicions quickly ..." Appellant's brief at 8 
quoting Lopez 873 P.2d at 1132. However, the Appellant tries to 
use that language to justify the fact that Officer Schmidt put 
his face into the appellee's vehicle to see if he could smell 
6
 Although the scope argument was not the ground relied on 
by the trial court, this Court may affirm the trial court's 
decision on any proper ground. State v. Elder, 815 P.2d 1341, 
1344 n. 4 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 
n. 1 (Utah App. 1996). 
11 
alcohol by arguing that such an act is justified by the fact that 
it would quickly confirm the officer's suspicion that there was 
an odor of alcohol in the vehicle.7 
Just because a desired result can be quickly acquired by a 
given course of conduct does not, by itself, justify that course 
of conduct. To hold otherwise would ratify all kinds of 
warrantless searches just because of the speed of the desired 
result. This type of "ends justifies the means" argument has 
never been the law under the Fourth Amendment. 
In addition to the requirement of acting quickly, an officer 
also has a requirement in his investigation to use the "least 
intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the 
officer's suspicion. . ." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 
103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 Led.2d 229 (1983). The least intrusive 
means in this case would have been for the officer simply to 
inquire of Mr. Burton if he had been drinking.8 How much he had 
been drinking? And at what time he had his first and last 
drinks? Depending on the answers to those questions, the officer 
may have had sufficient reason to ask Mr. Burton to get out of 
7
 Actually, the Appellant argued that such an action quickly 
confirmed the suspicion that Burton was drunk. (Appellant's 
brief at 8). The odor of alcohol within a vehicle could not by 
itself confirm or dispel the suspicion that Mr. Burton was drunk 
but may confirm a hunch that he had been drinking. 
8
 The officer testified that based on what he could recall, 
he asked the appellee if he had been drinking. (Transcript at 
15). However, a review of the record fails to shows that any 
such question was made prior to the officer putting his face and 
head into the passenger compartment of the appellee's vehicle. 
(Transcript at 17-18). 
12 
the vehicle and then proceed with an investigation of driving 
under the influence.9 
The officer put his face into the passenger compartment of 
the appellee's vehicle for the purpose of detecting the odor of 
alcohol. (Transcript at 12). The Utah Supreme Court in State v. 
Schlosserr held that the officer went beyond the scope of the 
initial traffic stop by opening the passenger door and scanning 
the interior of the cab of a truck. The Utah Supreme Court held 
that such action of the officer was a search and had to be 
supported by probable cause. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989). 
Schlosser cites to the United States Supreme Court case of New 
York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114-115, 106 S.Ct. 960, 966-67, 89 
L.Ed.2d 81 (1986), where the Court stated that "a car's interior 
as a whole is . . . subject to Fourth Amendment protection from 
unreasonable intrusions by the police." In Class, the Court held 
that an officer's opening of an automobile door to look at the 
vehicle identification number constituted a "search." 475 U.S. 
at 114, 119, 106 S.Ct. At 966, 969. An Officer putting his face 
and later his head into the passenger compartment of a vehicle 
9
 Appellant argues that one of the facts that support the 
officer's intrusion into the passenger compartment of the 
appellee's vehicle is that Mr. Burton volunteered that he was 
drunk. Such an argument has no foundation. Nowhere in the 
record does Mr. Burton volunteer that he was drunk. Appellant 
states this in his Relevant Facts but provides no cite as to 
where to find such an admission in the record. Later in the 
Appellant's Brief, the Appellant indicates that this admission is 
found on the video. However, no such admission is found in the 
record for review in this case. The Appellee, therefore, 
respectfully requests this court to ignore the ten or more 
references in the Appellant's Brief to such an alleged admission. 
13 
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. "In Arizona v. 
Hicksr 480 U.S. 321, 325, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 1153, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 
(1987), the Supreme Court held that even a small intrusion beyond 
the legitimate scope of an initially lawful search is unlawful 
under the Fourth Amendment." Schlosserf 774 P.2d 1132, 1135; See 
also State v. Gallegos. 712 P.2d 207 (Utah 1985). The Schlosser 
case cites to cases on point from other jurisdictions. 774 P.2d 
at 1136-37. One in particular is Commonwealth Vt Poflgurski, 386 
Mass. 385, 436 N.E.2d 150 (1982), cert. Denied, 459 U.S. 1222, 
103 S.Ct. 1167, 75 L.Ed.2d 464 (1983), where the Massachusetts 
court held that the officer's poking his head inside a slightly 
open sliding door required suppression of the evidence. Another 
case on point is People v. Aquinof 119 A.D.2d 464 500 N.Y.S.2d 
677, 679 (1986), where the officer did not merely look into the 
vehicle from the outside but bent his head into the car to 
conduct a visual inspection of what would otherwise be hidden 
from plain view. Such conduct was improper. Id. 
Assuming arguendo that the trial judge made a correct 
holding that an unverified odor of alcohol, that may have been 
coming from the street, (transcript at 12) constituted reasonable 
suspicion to believe that the appellee was driving under the 
influence, the officer still exceeded the scope of that purported 
belief by putting his face and head into the passenger 
compartment of the appellee's vehicle. 
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III. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRIOR TO THE ILLEGAL 
SEARCH TO JUSTIFY THE OFFICER CHANGING THE SCOPE OF THE 
INVESTIGATION FROM THAT OF A HEADLIGHT VIOLATION TO 
THAT OF AN INVESTIGATION OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF ALCOHOL. 
The officer did not have sufficient evidence, independent of 
the illegal search to justify an investigation of DUI. For an 
officer legally to detain an individual, the United States 
Supreme Court has held that the officer must have reasonable 
suspicion based on specific and articulable facts "that criminal 
activity is afoot." Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 
1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Here, the officer had reasonable 
suspicion based on articulable facts that the appellee had 
committed the crime of driving without headlights. 
After making the stop in this case, the officer was limited 
to citing the appellee for driving without his headlights on and 
letting him go on his way. Lopezr 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994). In 
order to be justified in investigating the crime of DUI, he must 
have had reasonable suspicion that the crime of DUI had occurred. 
Id. There is no bright line test for determining if reasonable 
suspicion exists. State v. Stewardf 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 
1991). Rather, the courts must look at the totality of the 
circumstances. United States? v, SokolPW, 490 U.S. l, 8, 109 
S.Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989). 
The officer must be able to articulate some unlawful or 
suspicious behavior connecting the detainee to the alleged 
suspected criminal activity. State v. Potterr 224 Utah Adv. Rep. 
19, 21 (Utah App. 1993). In the present case, the officer 
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approached the appellee's vehicle with a hunch that the appellee 
was driving under the influence and even discussed it with his 
ride-a-long passenger. When he approached, he had no evidence 
that the appellee was driving under the influence. There was no 
driving pattern to indicate otherwise and when he approached the 
appellee he had no other evidence. The officer requested the 
appellee's driver license, registration and insurance 
information, and immediately, upon making this request put his 
face into the passenger compartment of the vehicle. 
The appellant argues that there was enough evidence 
available to the officer prior to the illegal search and bases 
that argument on two grounds. First, the appellant argues that 
the officer detected the odor of alcohol before he searched the 
interior of the appellee's vehicle. The trial judge erroneously 
found that the officer initially smelled the odor of alcohol and 
bases that finding on the fact that the officer nodded to the 
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passenger. (Transcript at 32).10 The trial court's finding is 
clearly erroneous based on the evidence available to the court.11 
The second ground for the Appellant's argument is that the 
appellee voluntarily admitted that he was drunk before the 
officer inserted his nose or any other portion of his body into 
the vehicle. (Appellant's brief at 10). As indicated earlier, 
the record does not support an allegation that the appellee ever 
made the statement that he was drunk. Furthermore, the record 
does show that the only statement made by the appellee prior to 
the officer sticking his head into the vehicle was the word 
"yeah" in response the officer requesting the appellee's driver 
The trial court stated that "it is obvious on the tape, 
[that the officer] initially smells the odor of alcohol, just by 
the nod and what I previously said." (Transcript at 32) . 
However, the nod to the passenger, in confirmation of what they 
had discussed, did not occur until after the officer had put his 
head inside the passenger compartment of the vehicle. 
(Transcript at 18-19). With regards to what the trial court had 
"previously said,M a review of the transcript does not indicate 
why the trial court made any findings as to when the officer 
first detected the odor of alcohol. The closest statement made 
by the court is that "[the officer] goes and speaks to Mr. 
Burton. He smells the odor of alcohol . . ." (Transcript at 27). 
A review of the transcript shows that this finding by the court 
is also unsupported by the testimony. (See footnote 3). 
11
 The Appellant argues that the trial court "specifically 
stated that the presence of the odor outside of the vehicle 
constituted a reasonable suspicion that Burton was drunk ..." 
(Appellant's brief at 10). The Appellant cites to the transcript 
at 34 for that specific statement. With due respect to counsel 
for the Appellant, the trial court did not make such a statement. 
What the trial court stated is that the officer had "reasonable 
articulable suspicion to investigate but not to search, and by— 
by sticking his head into the window, through the window into the 
compartment of the car, that's a search. And when you're 
searching the car, you need more." (Transcript at 34) . 
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license, registration and proof of insurance. (Transcript at 17-18). 
The Appellant argues that it would have obtained the 
evidence from the field sobriety tests if no misconduct had 
occurred. (Appellant brief at 11). The record does not support 
such an argument. "[A] search and seizure without a warrant is 
per se unreasonable and . . . the state has the burden to 
establish the legality of the search in such a case." State v. 
Leef 633 P.2d 48, 65 (Utah 1981). What the Appellant proved at 
the hearing is that the officer could not remember what lead up 
to his placing his face inside the window the appellee's vehicle. 
The officer made inconsistent statements as to how much 
conversation took place before he allegedly smelled the odor of 
alcohol. The officer testified that the appellee spoke with him 
several times and during that conversation is when he smelled the 
odor of alcohol. (Transcript at 12). 
In later testimony, after a review of the video tape, the 
officer testified that the only word spoken to him by the 
appellee was "yeah." (Transcript at 17-18). When the officer 
testifies that he smelled the odor of alcohol before he put his 
face in the window, he was not "sure the odor of alcohol was 
coming from the car and not on the street or anything right by 
there, because it is a heavily traveled road with a lot of 
pedestrian traffic and sometimes ..." (Then the prosecutor 
interrupted him)(Transcript at 12). The officer approached the 
vehicle with nothing more that a hunch that the appellee was 
driving under the influence. The officer had discussed with his 
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ride-a-along passenger the officer's unsupported hunch that the 
ciotemi.mt Wii!', ih i IMI i in |i iiiiticllfi I In iiil" l l n e n i ' v ( T I . I I I S C I i p t . i t 1f)) . 
The officer probably wantea impress his ride-a-long passenger 
and to do this he would need ' confirm that the appellee had 
beef"' I r i iiik i IIII.J „ 'I'll iii i. nL | . . . ispujida «J' i < h l '-v* | n | v I » i t iM| " 
the headlight violation, accompanied by his desire t : jook good 
front of li is i::i de-a-long passenger is further evidence that 
t h e o f f I c e r • ::l :i cii i n ::>t = .me ] ] 1111'"»' I 11111') p i' i o r s e a i c • I* I I  i e t u t ; c i j o r 
of the car for the odor of alcohol. 
The Appellant d I :I not establish that the officer would have 
obtained the evidence i f no misconduct had occurred. The 
evidence acquired as a result ol the Illegal search was the odor 
nl rH < oholl nnl in I I t he t:'viiJpnrc nil t tint*1 fi e] d sobr i et:;y tests and 
breath test which stemmed i ^a . searcl The 
Appellant did not establish r i1 motion hearing evidence to 
have j -- : : .rl i f r|ii i: : 
to submit • the ("jeld sobriety tests absent the illegal search. 
There was also nn testimony that the officer would have had the 
a | iip e l l e e qet ; m i l nil II llll'ii",11 \ e 11 11 • II t •" .iiiiiiin II s u b m i l . I  i I l i e 1 j i « l < i sol;,)]" J e t y 
tests. Therefore, the Appellant's argument that police would 
have obtained the evidence even had no misconduct had taken place 
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IV. THE INVESTIGATION OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
ALCOHOL WHICH OCCURRED AFTER THE ILLEGAL SEARCH WAS NOT 
SUFFICIENTLY ATTENUATED FROM THE PRIOR ILLEGALITY TO 
JUSTIFY ITS ADMISSIBILITY. 
The Appellant, in section III of its brief argues that the 
evidence of the field sobriety tests and the arrest of the 
appellee should not be suppressed because it was not obtained 
from the search. Such an argument ignores the law of the fruit 
of the poisonous tree doctrine and the doctrine of attenuation. 
It is apparent from the record that the odor and all 
evidence acquired thereafter, stemmed from the illegal search of 
the appellee's vehicle. In addition, the Appellant had the 
burden of proving that the consent for the subsequent evidence 
was attenuated from the prior illegality. State v. Thurman, 846 
P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993); State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 
1990). The Appellant presented no evidence that the subsequent 
field sobriety tests and acquisition of other evidence was in any 
way attenuated from the prior illegal search. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the appellee respectfully 
requests that the Court affirm the trial court's ruling granting 
the motion to suppress. 
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II ) THE INVESTIGATION OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
ALCOHOL WHICH OCCURRED AFTER THE ILLEGAL SEARCH WAS 
SUFFICIENTLY ATTENUATED FROM THE PRIOR ILLEGALITY TO 
JUSTIFY ITS ADMISSIBILITY. 
M,, Aji.n-l l,ir • „ -j-Tt I'M I I 1 Ml its brief argues that the 
evidence of field sobriety tests and the arrest : he 
appellee should not r.- suppressed because ^as not obtained 
from
 L r u ± L 
ot the poisonous tree doctrine and the doctrine of attenuation. 
I I is apparent from the record that the odor and all 
evidence acqui11»tJ - «:»t < - mm* • <I I i » » m I 11 <' i I h » i j. i J s • • ;. 
the appellee's vehicle • addition, the Appellant had the 
burden o4 proving that the consent ^ : ^  subsequent evidence 
was attenuated from. . State \ , Thurman 
P,2d 1256 (Utah 1993); State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 
!*i9i)i The Appellant presented no evidence that the subsequent 
field sobriety tests and acquisition ot ot hoi evidence was in \\\ 
way attenuated from the prior ill egal search. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the appellee respectfully 
n.»queflts that ill i Zo nil ctfl inn tlio trial court's l u n n granting 
the motion to suppress. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of December, 1996. 
^ ^ — ^ % ^ 
BENJAMIN A. HAMILTON 
Attorney for Appellee 
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